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Between 2007 and 2009, government expenditures increased rapidly across the OECD countries.
While economic research on the impact of government purchases has flourished, in the data, about
three quarters of the increase in expenditures in the United States (and more in other countries) was
in government transfers.  We document this fact, and show that the increase in U.S. spending on retirement,
disability, and medical care has been as high as the increase in government purchases.  We argue that
future research should focus on the positive impact of transfers.  Towards this, we present a model
in which there is no representative agent and Ricardian equivalence does not hold because of uncertainty,
imperfect credit markets, and nominal rigidities.  Targeted lump-sum transfers are expansionary both
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After many years of neglect, the positive implications of government spending for business-
cycle dynamics are again at the center of research. In part, there is a pressing real-world
motivation behind this interest. All over the developed world, ￿scal spending increased
rapidly between 2007 and 2009 and, in the United States, the ratio of government expendi-
tures to GDP increased by 4.4%, the largest two-year increase since 1950-52. New theoret-
ical research on the topic has characterized the circumstances under which an increase in
government consumption can lead to a signi￿cant increase in output in neoclassical and new
Keynesian DSGE models.1 Recent empirical studies have used a variety of econometric
techniques and data sources to identify the impact of changes in government purchases on
output and employment.2
Many lessons have come out of this recent work, but there is a discomforting disconnect
between the motivation and the research that has sprung from it. While in the world,
government expenditures have increased, the research has been mostly about increases in
government purchases (consumption plus investment). Expenditures are the sum of pur-
chases with two other components, one small￿ interest payments￿ and another that is very
large￿ transfers.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to describe empirically the components of the
increase in ￿scal expenditures during the great recession. Section 2 shows that, from the
end of 2007 until the end of 2009, only one quarter of the increase in U.S. government
expenditures is accounted for by government purchases. Three quarters of the increase are
due to increases in transfers, of which, in turn, three quarters are social transfers. Looking
across a sample of 22 countries in the OECD and Europe, the United States does not stand
out in this regard. In every country where spending increased, at least 30% of the increase
was driven by transfers. The median share of transfers in the increase in spending is 64%.
1Just in the last two years, see Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2009), Hall (2009), Woodford
(2011), Erceg and Linde (2010) Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Uhlig (2010), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2010),
Ilzetzki et al. (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2010a)
2In the recent past, see Perotti (2008), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Corsetti et al. (2009), Mertens and
Ravn (2010b), Barro and Redlick (2009), Ramey (2009), Nekarda and Ramey (2010), Krenn and Gordon
(2010), Monacelli et al. (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010)
Shoag (2010), Serrato and Wingender (2010)
2In one particular government program that has attracted some attention, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the share of government purchases is even smaller.
Looking in more detail at the components of the U.S. increase in social transfers, the
three categories of retirement spending, medical care and income assistance alone account
for a 2% increase in expenditures over GDP. This increase is as large as the increase in
government purchases plus unemployment insurance. Trying to explain what is behind the
rise of social transfers, we show that a few variables (the fraction of the population over
65, the unemployment rate, and the price of health care) can account for about half of the
total increase during 2007-2009.
Most macroeconomic models of business cycles assume a representative agent, so that
lump-sum transfers from one group of agents to another have no e⁄ect on aggregate employ-
ment and output. Many also assume that the conditions for Ricardian equivalence hold,
so that government transfers across time are likewise neutral. The second contribution of
this paper is to propose a new model that merges the emphasis on incomplete markets and
social insurance that is typical in studies of public ￿nance with the emphasis on intertem-
poral labor supply and nominal rigidities that is common in studies of the business cycle.
We propose a new model in section 3 where lump-sum transfers, directed from one group
in the population to another, can boost employment and output. The key ingredients of
the model are idiosyncratic, uninsurable uncertainty about income and health, and nomi-
nal rigidities in price setting. Under di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations, our model nests
three conventional models: the neoclassical growth model, the Aiyagari incomplete markets
model, and a sticky-information new Keynesian model.
Lump-sum directed transfers boost output and employment through two new channels
in our model. The ￿rst is a neoclassical channel, whereby the marginal worker is more
willing to work to pay for higher transfers to those less fortunate. The second is a Keynesian
channel, whereby transferring resources from households with low marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) to those with a high MPC boosts aggregate demand.
Sections 4 and 5 make a ￿rst attempt at quantitatively evaluating the roles of these
channels. According to the model, targeted increases in transfers are expansionary, rais-
ing both employment and output, and while their gross impact is smaller than that of
3government purchases, the net impact on private consumption and investment, is signi￿-
cantly larger. In the baseline calibration in this paper, the overall e⁄ect of either form of
government spending is small. However, we should note from the start that our simple
model ignores many of the ingredients that the recent literature has shown can signi￿cantly
boost spending multipliers, so our quantitative results should be interpreted with caution.
A more enduring lesson that we take from our quantitative experiments is that transfer
programs that are targeted at di⁄erent groups can have very di⁄erent aggregate impacts.
Section 6 o⁄ers some brief conclusions. The main message of the paper can be sum-
marized in one sentence: Future macroeconomic research on ￿scal policy should focus more
on social transfers.
2 The weight of transfers in the ￿scal expansion
Over the last 60 years, ￿scal spending has continuously increased and its share of U.S. GDP
in 2007 was about double what it was in 1947. At the same time, there has been a dramatic
compositional shift away from purchases and towards transfers, which more than tripled as
a ratio of GDP over the past 50 years, and by 2007 accounted for 39% of the total budget.
Between the last quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2009, U.S. government spending
increased by 14.2%, or 4.4% of GDP.3 This refers to the integrated government spending, in-
cluding both federal, state and local governments. Looking at the components of spending,
government investment accounts for 5.6% of that increase, while government consumption
was responsible for 21.1%. Transfers alone account for 75.3% of the total increase in
spending, or 3.4% of GDP.4
One may wonder whether this increase in transfers is unusual, relative to recent trends.
3We start our sample in the last quarter of 2007 because the National Bureau of Economic Research
determined December 2007 as the start of the recession. We stop at the end of 2009 for two reasons. First,
because especially in countries other than the United States, there was a reversal in the policy towards ￿scal
austerity in 2010. Second, because we will supplement the data on U.S. total spending with more detailed
data on the components of spending, but this is only available anually.
4Our data comes from NIPA table 3.1, and our categories match those in that table as follows: total
spending is the sum of consumption expenditures, gross investment, capital transfers, net purchases of assets
minus consumption of ￿xed capital; consumption equals consumption expenditures minus consumption of
￿xed capital; transfers equals government social bene￿ts plus subsidies plus capital transfers; and investment
is the residual.
4To address this issue, we compute the following statistic: we add nominal GDP growth to
the trend increase in the years prior to the crisis, using a linear trend ￿t to the data between
1998Q4 and 2006Q4.5 According to this measure of the ￿normal￿increase in transfers,
taking growth and the usual trend into account, transfers were predicted to increase by only
2.8% during the two years. Instead they increased by 27.4%.
Another concern is that many tax deductions can be seen as negative transfers (e.g.,
tax credits for tuition). These tax expenditures, as they are sometimes called, have grown
signi￿cantly in the last two decades but it is di¢ cult to measure their size in the U.S.
budget. The 3.4% of GDP increase in transfers calculated above assumed that there are
no such tax expenditures. If one takes the opposite view, that all taxes and social security
contributions are negative transfers, then the increase in transfer rises to 6.6% of GDP.
2.1 International comparison: is the U.S. ￿scal expansion unusual?
Using quarterly data for 22 developed countries between 2007Q4 and 2009Q4, table 1 reports
the growth of expenditures and transfers.6 Starting with the second column in the table,
in only one country, Hungary, have government expenditures fallen and, in most of them,
spending has increased well above their trend in the past decade. The increase in spending
in the United States may be very large compared to its history, but it is only the 6th largest
in the sample.
The following two columns have the share of the increase attributed to either transfers
or purchases.7 The dominance of transfers is true for many countries. In 13 out of the
other 20 countries for which expenditures increased, transfers accounted for a larger share
of the increase than purchases. In no country were transfers responsible for less than 30%
of the total increase in expenditures.
The ￿fth column presents the ￿unusual growth￿ in transfers de￿ned in the previous
section: the proportional increase in transfers minus the proportional increase in GDP over
the same period, and the 8-quarter predicted increase in total spending from a linear trend
5We chose 8 years, but starting in 1996 or 2000 does not make a large di⁄erence.
6We obtained data for as many countries as we could ￿nd, from two sources, the OECD Economic Outlook
and Eurostat. The construction of the series followed the same guidelines as used in NIPA, and we used the
U.S. series in the OECD to ensure that the de￿nitions of the categories of government spending matched.
7The two do not add up to one because of the omission of the change in interest payments.
5￿t to the years between 1998Q4 and 2006Q4. By this measure, the United States is only
beaten by Ireland, Slovakia and Finland. Moreover, in only two out of the twenty two
countries did transfers grow less than what would be expected. Everywhere else, transfers
grew at an extraordinary rate, often by more than 10%.
2.2 The 2009 stimulus package
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a federal program explicitly
designed to provide ￿scal stimulus to the U.S. economy. In work parallel to ours, Cogan
and Taylor (2010) looked at the components of $862 billion spending within the ARRA.
Their ￿rst conclusion is that, halfway through 2010, only $18 billion had been spent on
federal purchases. A large part of the program consisted of transfers to state and local
governments. Yet, purchases at these levels of the government have also barely changed
since 2008. Rather, at the local and state level, it is transfers that increased at a rapid rate
absorbing, together with payment of past debt, almost the entire ARRA funds. Moreover,
52% of the ARRA grants to state and local government in 2009 were accounted for by
Medicaid. Therefore, the discretionary response to ￿scal spending was even more dominated
by transfers than the overall change in spending.
2.3 Looking at the components of transfers: where is the increase?
Table 2 uses the annual data from Table 3.12 of NIPA to group social transfers into four
categories. First are social transfers associated with retirement and disabilities, most promi-
nently through pensions paid by the Social Security system.8 Second is spending driven
by medical reasons, the bulk of which is accounted for by Medicare and Medicaid.9 Third
is unemployment insurance, perhaps the transfer that ￿rst comes to mind as increasing
during a recession. The last group includes all other transfers, mostly from income support
8Concretely, this category includes the sum of spending on: old-age, survivors, and disability insur-
ance; railroad retirement; pension bene￿t guaranty; veterans￿life insurance; veterans￿bene￿ts pension and
disability; and state and local government￿ s temporary disability insurance.
9This category includes spending in: hospital and supplementary medical insurance ; workers￿compen-
sation; military medical insurance; black lung bene￿ts; state and local government workers￿compensation;
and state and local government￿ s medical care.
6programs.10
The broad trends in these categories are well-known: health has been rising steadily at
the expense of retirement in terms of the overall budget, and unemployment insurance spikes
up in recessions. In the period between 2007 and 2009, the largest share of the increase
in social transfers, 29.5%, is in medical expenses. The second largest share is spending
on retirement and disabilities, which accounts for 24.0% of the increase in total transfer
spending. Unemployment insurance actually only appears in third place accounting for
23.6% of the increase, and only slightly more than other categories, which account for the
remaining 22.8%.
From reading the press or following the political debate, one may not have guessed
this: between 2007 and 2009, government expenditures on medical care, retirement and
disabilities have grown as much as government purchases.
2.4 Discretionary social transfers?
Some of the increase in transfers was predictable and probably would have occurred even
without a recession.
For instance, retirement and disabilities spending increased by 15.5% between 2007 and
2009. Taking out the population growth rate and in￿ ation (measured using the GDP
de￿ ator), the increase in real per capita transfers was 9.8%. To gauge how much of this
increase was discretionary, we estimated a linear regression with the log of real spending
per capita as the dependent variable and as independent variables: a constant, the share of
the total population that is not on the labor force and is more than 65 years old, and the
share of the population that is older than 65 We ran the regression in ￿rst di⁄erences to
deal with the clear trends in the sample between 1976 and 2006. Using the actual values
for 2008 and 2009 in this ￿tted equation, the total residual for these two years is 5.6%.
That is, a little over one half of the total increase in transfers is accounted for by in￿ ation,
aging of the population, and a larger fraction of those over 65 leaving the labor force.
Turning to medical spending, the consumer price index for medical care increased by
10Half of this is accounted for by three categories: the earned income tax credit, the supplemental nutrition
assistance program, and various supplemental security income programs.
77.0% while the non-medical component of the headline consumer price index increased by
only 3.2%. As a result, of the 13.3% increase in medical transfers between 2007 and 2009,
7.0% were accounted for by higher prices and the remainder by more quantity. Therefore,
the increasing cost of health care in the United States can account for more than half of the
increase in the largest category of spending. Looking at the breakdown between price and
quantity in the last twenty years (not reported), the recent increase in quantity is above
usual, as typically prices account for only about half of the increase in spending. Finally,
spending on Medicaid has increased proportionately less than spending on all medical care,
so we cannot account for this increase in transfers solely as a result of more people satisfying
the means test to be admitted to the program.
Turning to unemployment insurance, total per capita real spending increased by 276%
between 2007 and 2009. Dividing by the number of unemployed, the real amount per
number of unemployed increased by only 69%. We regressed, in ￿rst di⁄erences on the 1967-
2006 sample, the log of this variable on a constant and two variables: the unemployment
rate to capture systematic increases in the generosity of the system as more people lose
their jobs; and the median duration of unemployment to capture changes in bene￿ts as
people remain unemployed for longer. The two residuals in 2008 and 2009 add up to only
13.2%. That is, even though one of the anti-crisis measures was extending the duration of
unemployment bene￿ts, this so far seems to have led to a modest increase in government
spending on the program.
2.5 Bringing the facts together
All over the developed world, the large ￿scal expansions of 2007-09 have been mostly about
increasing social transfers. This is also true in the United States, a leading example of
a country with simultaneously large increases in government expenditures primarily due
to transfers. While public works and other purchases dominate the public debate, it is
medical care, retirement and disability that account for the bulk of this increased spending.
A handful of variables can account, almost mechanically, for about half of the increase in
social transfers, with the remainder perhaps due to discretionary ￿scal stimulus.
83 A model to understand the positive e⁄ects of transfers
Most models of economic ￿ uctuations assume a representative agent and lump-sum taxes
and transfers. As a result, these models predict that government transfers across agents
or across time do not a⁄ect any aggregate quantities, so the ￿scal expansion in transfers in
2007-09 should have been neutral with respect to employment and output.
There are two existing economic channels in the literature through which transfers are
not neutral. One assumes that transfers are not lump-sum, but distort marginal rewards
and relative prices. This is certainly realistic as many transfer programs are progressive in
order to provide social insurance. It is well understood that, if a change in transfers lowers
the returns to working and saving, it will reduce employment and output. It is much less
clear whether the expansion in social transfers in 2007-09 increased or lowered marginal
rewards.
The second mechanism works through increases in the public debt raising the supply of
assets that agents can use to self-insure against shocks. Woodford (1990) and Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998) provide two di⁄erent models to capture this e⁄ect. In Woodford (1990),
increasing transfers raises investment and output by loosening liquidity constraints, whereas
in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) transfers lower capital and output by reducing the need
for precautionary savings. Not only in theory, but also in practice, it is far from clear
in which direction this e⁄ect played out in 2007-09. During this period, U.S. public debt
increased but private debt fell, so that the total amount of domestic non￿nancial debt grew
at the slowest rate in the past decade. Whether there are more or fewer assets available
for households to smooth shocks is a matter of interpretation.
In this paper, we propose a third, new mechanism through which lump-sum transfers
have aggregate e⁄ects: targeting. Transfers across di⁄erent groups of households will raise
consumption and increase labor supply for some, while lowering it for others. If the transfer
is well-targeted, the e⁄ect on the former can exceed the countervailing e⁄ect on the latter,
leading to an increase in employment and output. Our model has two key ingredients.
First, as in public ￿nance studies of transfers, households face borrowing constraints and
su⁄er idiosyncratic shocks to income and health against which they cannot insure. By
redistributing wealth across agents, transfers increase the labor supply of households and
9boost consumption for those who could not borrow. Second, as in models of economic
￿ uctuations, there are nominal rigidities as producers only update their information and
prices sporadically. Transfers raise aggregate demand, thereby raising production by ￿rms
that are stuck with low prices. The model merges the work on incomplete markets and
on nominal rigidities, recently surveyed in Heathcote et al. (2009) and Mankiw and Reis
(2010) respectively. For di⁄erent particular parameter con￿gurations, it nests three well-
known models: the neoclassical growth model with government spending of Baxter and
King (1993), the incomplete-markets model of Aiyagari (1994), and the sticky-information
model in Mankiw and Reis (2002).
3.1 The households
There is a continuum of households that in each period are characterized by a triplet fk;s;hg
where k is their capital, s their individual-speci￿c salary o⁄er, and h is their health a⁄ecting
the relative disutility of working. The problem of each agent is:
V (k;s;h) = max
c;n;k0
￿





n 2 f0;1g; c ￿ 0, and k0 ￿ 0. (2)









1 with probability ￿
draw from U[0;￿] with probability 1 ￿ ￿
and i.i.d. (5)
The variables and functions are: V (:) is the value function, c is consumption, n is the
choice to work or not, r is the gross interest rate, w is the average wage, d are dividends,
￿ are lump-sum taxes, T(:) are non-negative lump-sum transfers, and z(:) are insurance
payments. As for the parameters: ￿ is the disutility from working with the worst possible
health, ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ is the depreciation rate, ￿ and ￿2 are the persistence and
variance of shocks to salary o⁄ers, ￿ is the probability that the person is healthy and ￿
controls the average utility gap between the healthy and the unhealthy. Throughout the
paper, F(:) will denote cumulative density functions, and a prime in a variable denotes its
10value one period ahead.
Going through each expression in turn, equation (1) states that households wish to
consume more and su⁄er from working if they are unhealthy. They live forever and face
uncertainty about their future health as well as their future salary. There could also be
additional terms attributing utility directly from both government spending as well as from
health regardless of whether the household works or not. The implicit assumption is not
that these terms do not exist, but rather that they enter utility additively. While they
would a⁄ect welfare characterizations, they are irrelevant for the positive properties of the
model that we will focus on.
We include health shocks for two separate reasons. First, because, as documented
in section 2, medical care is the largest government expense on social transfers. Second,
because there is extensive evidence that health is a major source of shocks to household
wealth. Surveys of people entering personal bankruptcy have found that 62% claim that
medical expenses were an important factor in leading to bankruptcy (Himmelstein et al.
(2009)). Closer to our model, 40% of the survey respondents answer that recent health
shocks led them to lose more than two weeks of work to care for themselves or others. Our
goal was to capture, in the simplest possible way, the uninsurable health uncertainty that
people face, the e⁄ects that its shocks have on people￿ s income, and the large amount of
social transfers that are contingent on health status.11
The conditions in (2) impose that households can choose whether to work or not, and
that they face a borrowing constraint so that they cannot leave a period with negative
assets. Equation (3) is the budget constraint stating that consumption plus savings, on
the left-hand side, must equal the income from interest on capital, wages from working,
dividends from ￿rms, transfers from the government, and insurance payments, minus paid
11Our model of health is admittedly stark. First, we do not introduce health as a separate good, but
interpret the utility function as the value function derived from optimal choices of health and ￿nal goods
consumption. Second, we do not model in kind health transfers because, as long as households do not
receive more in health transfers than they wanted to consume or, if they can sell part of the transfer, then
this would not make too much of a di⁄erence to our model and conclusions. A potentially more problematic
assumption for our model would be to allow people to invest in accumulating a stock of health, which could
compete with monetary savings, then it would matter to the e⁄ects that transfers have. We chose not to
follow this route because it would require careful modelling of the health-producing sector of the economy,
which was not our focus in this paper.
11taxes. Importantly, note that transfers are lump-sum: they depend only on the exogenous
characteristics of the household.
Equations (4) and (5) put strong assumptions on the stochastic processes for the two
shocks. These keep the solution of the model simple, but they could be relaxed while
keeping the model computationally feasible. The two shocks are independent across agents
and independent of each other, so at any period in time, the cross-sectional distribution of
salary o⁄ers is log normal with an average salary equal to E(sw) = w. The cross-sectional
distribution of health has point-mass at healthy people with h = 1, and then a uniform
distribution over how unhealthy other people are. A restrictive assumption is that health
shocks are independent over time. The time period in our model is one year, and the
health shocks are not meant to capture disability or old age, but rather temporary illness
that a⁄ects the ability to work and earn a wage.
The solution to this problem is a set of functions c￿(k;s;h), n￿(k;s;h); and k0￿(k;s;h)
that solve the Bellman equation determining how much each household consumes, works
and saves.
3.2 The ￿rms
There is a representative competitive ￿rm that produces the consumption good by combin-
ing capital K and intermediate goods x(j) according to the production function:






This ￿rm rents capital from households paying r per unit, and buys intermediates at prices
























There is also a continuum j 2 [0;1] of monopolistic ￿rms producing intermediate goods.
12They are equally owned by all household, making pro￿ts d(j); which they immediately
distribute as dividends. Each ￿rm operates a linear technology:
x(j) = l(j); (9)
where l(j) is the e⁄ective labor hired by ￿rm j.
All of the prices and returns so far have been denominated in real terms, in units of the
￿nal consumption good. Firms that produce intermediate good choose instead the nominal
price of their product, p(j)q where q is the price of the consumption good. These ￿rms have
sticky information: each period, a fraction ￿ of the ￿rms learn about the current state of
the world, while the remaining 1￿￿ have old information. Following an unexpected change
in period 1, then in period t there is a group of ￿rms with measure ￿t = ￿
Pt￿1
i=0(1 ￿ ￿)i
that know about it, and a second group with measure 1 ￿ ￿t that does not know and so
has not changed their price. Their optimal prices are then:
p(j) = ￿w if attentive, (10)
p(j) = ￿w0q0=q if inattentive, (11)
where w0 and q0 are the steady-state wages and prices, which ￿rms that are unaware of the
change still expect to be in place. The resulting pro￿ts are







wx(j) if inattentive, (13)
3.3 The government
The focus of this paper is on ￿scal policy. Leaving for future work the interactions of ￿scal
and monetary policy, we simply assume that the monetary authority keeps the price of the
consumption good q = 1, a strict form of price-level targeting.
The ￿scal authority chooses lump-sum transfers subject to the budget constraint:
G +
Z Z
T(s;h)dF(s;h) = ￿: (14)
13where G is exogenous government spending and ￿ is lump-sum taxes. There are two
important assumptions about ￿scal policy. First, transfers T(:) depend only on exogenous
characteristics of the households, so they do not distort optimal choices. Second, the budget
is balanced at every period in time, so there is no public debt outstanding. Therefore, we
neutralize the two previously studied mechanisms behind aggregate e⁄ects of changes in
transfers, so that we can focus on the new mechanism we propose.
There is no aggregate uncertainty in our economy, but we will consider unanticipated
shocks to G or T(:). We do so using perfect-foresight comparative statics: starting from a
steady-state that agents expected would persist forever, in period 1 they learn that there has
been a change to some exogenous aggregate variables. There are no further changes from
then on, and agents can foresee all of the future path for aggregate variables. This greatly
simpli￿es the numerical analysis and the experience with the neoclassical growth model is
that these perfect-foresight comparative statics are often not too far from the ￿rst-order
approximate solutions of stochastic models.
3.4 Market clearing, equilibrium and shocks
Households enter each period with di⁄erent wealth k as a result of di⁄erent shocks and
decisions about savings and work. Combining household optimal behavior with the exoge-
nous distribution of household characteristics gives the endogenous distribution F(k;s;h)
of households in the economy.
Both the capital market, where households rent capital to the ￿rm that produces ￿nal









k0￿(k;s;h)dF(k;s;h) = K0: (16)
Because the ￿rms are equally held by all households, total dividends paid equal dividends
received per capita: Z
d(j)dj = d: (17)
14Finally, this is a closed economy, so the insurance payments must add to zero:
Z
z(k;s;h)dF(k;s;h) = 0 (18)
We will focus on three aggregate variables in this model: aggregate output Y , aggregate
consumption C =
R
c￿(k;s;h)dF(k;s;h), and total employment E =
R
n￿(k;s;h)dF(k;s;h).
An equilibrium in these variables is characterized by households and ￿rms behaving opti-
mally and markets clearing, as de￿ned by equations (1)-(18).
3.5 The relation of our model to the literature
The two key ingredients in our model are imperfect insurance, present as long as the pay-
ments z(:) do not reproduce the Pareto optimum allocation of consumption and labor across
ex ante identical households, and nominal rigidities, present as long as ￿ < 1 so that fol-
lowing an aggregate shock ￿rms take time to learn about it and adjust their prices.
The following three results provide a map between our model and three popular models
in the literature:
Proposition 1 With full insurance, there is a representative household capturing consumer
choices, that solves the problem











C + K0 = (1 ￿ ￿ + r)K + wL + M (20)
taking wages, interest rates, and M; as given.
Proposition 2 Without nominal rigidities, there is a representative ￿rm solving:
maxfY ￿ rK ￿ (1 + ￿)wLg s.t. Y = AK￿L1￿￿ (21)
taking taxes ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1, wages and interest rates as given.
Proposition 3 If there is full insurance and no nominal rigidities, the aggregate equilib-
rium is the set fYt;Ct;Ltg such that the representative household in Proposition 1 behaves
15optimally, the representative ￿rm in proposition 2 behaves optimally, and in equilibrium:
M = ￿wL ￿ G: Equilibrium employment is:
E =
L + [￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)](E(s2) ￿ 1)
E(s2)
Combining these results covers three cases. First, with both complete insurance and
perfect price ￿ exibility, the model reduces to a standard neoclassical growth model with a
payroll tax, as used to study ￿scal shocks in Baxter and King (1993). The aggregate tech-
nology is a standard Cobb-Douglas function and the payroll tax captures the ine¢ ciency
brought about by markups in the intermediaries sector. The preferences of the represen-
tative agent are separable over time and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one.
As for labor supply, if everyone is healthy, then E = ￿ = 1 and all households work all the
time, so the model becomes identical to the textbook Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. At
the other extreme, if ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, then health is uniformly distributed between 0 and
1, and the implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply is exactly 1.
Second, if there is full insurance together with nominal rigidities, then the model is sim-
ilar to the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) with two main di⁄erences.
First, there is capital and investment. Second, the labor market is similar to that in Gali
(2010), with the di⁄erence that unemployment is the result not only of low salary o⁄ers,
but also of poor health.
Third, if prices are ￿ exible but there is no private insurance, then the model is close to
the version of the Aiyagari model in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010), expanded to have
health shocks. Without insurance, transfers move wealth across agents and a⁄ect their
willingness to work and consume.
From now onwards, we will assume that z(:) = 0, so there is no private insurance,
and that there are nominal rigidities so ￿ < 1. Our model di⁄ers from the standard
new Keynesian model because there is no representative agent. Closest to our study is
Zubairy (2010), who studies the ￿scal multiplier of transfers and other ￿scal policies in a
new Keynesian DSGE model. Transfers are lump-sum in her model as in ours, but they are
16de￿cit-￿nanced. She also assumes that debt is repaid in part by raising distortionary taxes.
Increasing transfers leads to higher future taxes, raising investment and labor supply today,
a mechanism that is absent from our model.
Our model di⁄ers from the work on incomplete markets because aggregate demand policy
has real e⁄ects. Moreover, we focus on transfers, unlike almost all of that literature, as
well as on the positive predictions of the model in response to shocks rather than on welfare
in the steady state.12 Closer to our paper is Heathcote (2005) who studies the e⁄ect of
a temporary tax cut on consumption in an incomplete markets economy. There are two
key di⁄erences between our setup and his. First, he obtains a link between wealth and
labor supply because consumption and leisure are substitutes, so transfers that raise wealth
will both increase consumption and labor supply. Instead, we assume that consumption
and leisure are separable in the utility function and focus on the wealth e⁄ect of transfers
on labor supply, whereas Heathcote (2005) assumes preferences for which labor supply is
independent of wealth. Second, he focuses on the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on the stock
of available debt, similarly to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), which we neutralized by
assuming a balanced budget.
4 Targeting and the impact of transfers on aggregate activity
Having set up the model, we now turn to the central question of the paper: What is the
e⁄ect on output and employment of an increase in transfers?
4.1 The neoclassical growth benchmark
A ￿rst answer is provided by two of the benchmark models described in the previous section.
In both the neoclassical growth model and in the baseline new Keynesian model there is
full insurance. Accordingly, as an immediate consequence from Proposition 1:
Corollary 4 With full insurance, the choice of T(s;h) is irrelevant for aggregate output
and employment.
12Floden (2001) also studies transfers but focuses on welfare at the steady state.
17Because there is a representative agent, any rearrangement of wealth across households
is undone by equivalent insurance payments. Changes in transfer payments are neutral
with respect to economic activity.
4.2 Choosing parameter values
Without insurance payments, the model must be solved numerically. The appendix de-
scribes the algorithm we used. We picked the parameter values described in Table 1 to
calibrate the steady state of the neoclassical growth model to a few moments.
The ￿rst section of the table has conventional targets and parameter choices for the
production technology and household preferences. The second section has the parameters
linked to the behavior of the ￿rms producing intermediate goods: the average markup is
25%, while 50% of ￿rms update their information every year. This extent of imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities is on the high side, but not out of line with usual values.
For the idiosyncratic shocks hitting households, we assume that salary o⁄ers are quite
persistent in line with the estimates in Storesletten et al. (2004). The choice of ￿ is at the
top range of their estimates, because they considered only continuously employed males,
whereas in our model, s are salary o⁄ers that may be turned down. For the health shocks,
we set ￿ to match the share of U.S. households in the labor force without any disability,
from Kapteyn et al. (2010). We set ￿ so that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.7,
the value suggested by Chetty (2009) in his recent synthesis of micro and macro estimates
in the literature. Finally, the third section has one parameter ￿ that was hard to calibrate
and requires a brief explanation. This parameter is pinned down by the average value of
G=Y . However, for high values of G=Y and corresponding high values of lump-sum taxes
￿, it was possible that sometimes an agent with a bad salary and health draws did not have
enough wealth to pay the tax bill. In other words, the natural debt limit is tighter than
zero. Instead, we calibrate to the case where G = 0, avoiding this problem.13
13Alternatively, to target the average G=Y in the post-war leads to ￿ = 3:00. The corresponding ￿gures
for the alternative calibration are available from the authors, and lead to a somewhat larger e⁄ect of ￿scal
policy on aggregate activity.
184.3 Targeted transfers: the neoclassical channel
With imperfect insurance, transfers from healthy high-salary households to those with low
wealth and low salaries boost employment and output through what we call a neoclassical
channel. Since the marginal worker pays more in taxes than she receives in transfers, more
generous transfers imply she has less wealth and so has a stronger incentive to work.
To understand this channel, panel A of ￿gure 1 plots the threshold ^ h(s) =
R
h￿(k;s)dF(k),
where h￿(k;s) is the optimal threshold function such that people work if and only if
h ￿ h￿(k;s). The locus is downward-sloping, and those above it are working, while those
below it are not working. Consider then a carefully targeted transfer from the population
in the middle box to the population in the corner box.14 Crucially, those receiving the
transfers are very far from ever working. Therefore, the extra wealth barely changes their
work decision. In contrast, those paying the transfer are at the margin between working or
not. As their wealth has fallen, they are more willing to take a job, boosting employment.
The other panels of ￿gure 1 have the impulse responses to this shock. To isolate
the neoclassical channel, we set ￿ = 1, so there are no nominal rigidities. In the top right
diagram, we see the increase in employment among the marginal workers, and the very slight
fall among other groups in the population. The bottom panels show that employment and
output both increase by about 0.8% of GDP for a 3.4% increase in transfers.
4.4 Targeted transfers: the Keynesian channel
Since the recipients of transfers have on average a higher MPC than the payees, transfers
boost aggregate demand, which ￿rms with rigid prices satisfy by hiring more workers and
producing more. This is an eminently Keynesian channel.
Panel A of ￿gure 2 plots the marginal propensities to consume out of cash on hand as
a function of the salary o⁄er for the healthy. That is, it plots m(s) =
R
[@c￿(k;s;1)=@[(1 ￿
￿ + r)k]]dF(k;1). Since this group of the population always chooses to work, there is no
wealth e⁄ect on labor supply and no neoclassical channel, so we can focus on the Keynesian
channel. Consider then a transfer from the group in the box on the right to the group in
14We consider a large increase in transfers, of 4.4% of GDP, the total increase in government expenditures
during 2007:4 to 2009:4. Our goal in this section is still to just gauge the e⁄ects qualitatively.
19the box on the left. This will boost aggregate consumption, and if some price plans are
￿xed, the increased demand will induce ￿rms to increase hiring and production.
Panels B to D of ￿gure 2 plot the impulse responses. As expected, the increase in con-
sumption from the transfer recipients is higher than that from the transfer payees, leading
to an expansion. The overall impact is about one-tenth of the neoclassical experiment, and
because consumption increases by relatively more, there is also a deeper slump after impact
due to decumulation of capital.
5 The quantitative e⁄ect of the 2007-09 ￿scal expansion
Section 2 documented that, between 2007:4 and 2009:4, transfers and government purchases
increased by 3.4% and 1% of GDP, respectively. What was the e⁄ect of these changes on
output and employment according to our model?
5.1 The e⁄ect of transfers
There is no study on how U.S. transfers, as a whole, are distributed across di⁄erent groups
in the population. We proceed by considering two approximations.
First, we assume a discretionary increase in transfers, from the luckiest members of
society to the least lucky, in terms of their health and salary o⁄er. We engineer a transfer
from those in the top 17% of the health-salary o⁄er distribution to the bottom 14%, where
the thresholds were determined to make the transfer as focussed as possible, but not so
much that it would turn the rich into poor and vice-versa.
Second, we consider instead an increase in the generosity of a systematic policy rule for
transfers. In our rule, we want to capture two features of the U.S. system. First, that those
hit by low salary o⁄ers or disease receive more, so T(:) is decreasing in both arguments.
Second, that the healthy do not receive transfers associated with health. Towards this goal













I(h ￿ ￿) (22)
where I(x) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if x is true, and equal to zero otherwise.
20The parameter ￿s measures the money transfer to the person with the worst salary o⁄er in
the economy, and ￿h is the money transfer to the least healthy. The upper threshold for the
salary o⁄er ￿ s is at the 95th percentile of the distribution of s, and serves to keep transfers
bounded above. As for the 3/4 fraction, it ensures that the healthiest of the unhealthy
still receive a positive transfer (of ￿h=4), but which is four times smaller than the transfer
received by the most unhealthy.
The two parameters ￿s and ￿h are chosen to hit two calibration targets at the steady
state: the average ratio of total transfers to GDP between 2003 and 2007, and the average
share of medical care transfers in total transfers. The third section of table 3 reports the
choices. The ￿scal expansion of 2007-09 is then captured by an increase in both ￿s and ￿h
in the same proportion unexpectedly for one period.
Panels A and B of ￿gure 3 show marginal propensities to consume as well as the ^ h(s)
threshold for work decisions. Also in the picture is the function g(s) de￿ned as T(s;g(s)) =
￿. Those above this threshold are, on net after taxes, paying the government, whereas those
below are receiving a net positive transfer. Because g < h in most of the domain, increasing
the scope of systematic transfers still generates the neoclassical e⁄ect discussed earlier. And,
because the marginal propensities to consume for the less healthy and the less fortunate are
higher, the Keynesian e⁄ect will also be in place.
The impulse responses of employment and output are in panels C and D. Both employ-
ment and output increase, although by small amounts. Depending on how we model the
increase in transfers, the increase in output is only between 0.02 and 0.06% of GDP.
5.2 Multipliers and government purchases
Panels E and F of Figure 3 plot instead the e⁄ect of the increase in government purchases
during 2007-09, again assuming a one-time transitory increase in G. Employment rises, as
consumers work more to compensate for the lost wealth, and this raises output by a little
more than 0.06% of GDP. However, savings fall, lowering the capital stock and output from
the second period onwards.
Much of the debate on ￿scal spending has revolved around multipliers. It is tempting to
conclude from the ￿gure that the purchases multiplier is larger than the transfers multiplier.
21But it is not correct to compare the increase in output from an increase in transfers vis-￿-vis
an increase in purchases. Whereas a dollar spent on government purchases subtracts from
dollars available for private consumption, the same dollar in social transfers does not use
up any resources. A more appropriate comparison uses the net purchases multiplier, mea-
suring the increase in private consumption and investment. From this perspective, in our
model transfers are a signi￿cantly more e⁄ective way of boosting output than government
purchases.
Both multipliers are nonetheless quite small. Our model has a gross purchases multiplier
of 0.06, a small number when compared to the recent literature cited in footnote 1. There
are many reasons for the discrepancy, all of which are related to the simplicity of our model.
To name a few, our ￿scal shock is purely transitory, there are no adjustment costs that mute
the crowding-out e⁄ect on capital, and nominal interest rates are positive. Adding many
of these ingredients to our model may similarly increase the e⁄ect of transfers by as much
as an order of magnitude.
Our goal in this paper is to present the mechanism in the simplest possible way, and
the particular set of functional forms and parameters were chosen mostly so that the model
would nest three other existing models. We did not exhaustively search for modi￿cations
of the model that would both add realism and possibly boost the impact of transfers. The
next sub-section describes our exploration of alternatives.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis and the value of the marginal propensity to con-
sume
First, we made the shock persistent rather than one-period lived making sure that the
cumulative impact was the same. This lowered the initial impact of the shock, but it
reduced the negative posterior e⁄ect, leading output to often converge to its steady state
value from above. Second, we saw whether assuming that there are systematic transfers
in the steady state or not a⁄ected the responses of output and employment to shocks to
transfers or purchases. The di⁄erences were barely noticeable. Likewise, we replaced the
price-level targeting rule with nominal-income targeting and a Wicksellian interest-rate rule,
without any appreciable quantitative change. Fourth, the response to a purchases shock is
22similar in our model to what it would be in the neoclassical model covered in Proposition
3. Finally, since the model is non-linear we explored varying the size of the initial shock.
Doubling the shocks more than doubles the impact, but the qualitative dynamics are similar.
Two facts lead us to suspect that our model underestimates the size of the transfers
e⁄ect. First, because there are no adjustment costs of investment, the capital stock falls
signi￿cantly in response to the ￿scal programs, leading to a large negative e⁄ect that dom-
inates even a few periods after the shock. Yet, Burnside et al. (2004) and others have
typically found that investment falls only little, if at all, in response to ￿scal shocks. Sec-
ond, the average MPC in our model is 11%. Yet, Parker et al. (2011) in their thorough
study of the e⁄ect of tax rebates on consumption found average marginal propensities to
consume between 12% and 30%.
To address these two pitfalls, we made two coarse modi￿cations to the model. First, we
￿xed the aggregate capital stock K and set the depreciation rate to zero, so that consumers
now save in shares of this ￿xed amount, and the marginal return to capital is paid as
dividends to these shares. This eliminates the crowding-out of capital entirely. Second, we
lowered ￿ to 0.85 so that consumers are more impatient, hit the borrowing constraint more
often and so have higher propensities to consume, close to the ones estimated by Parker
et al. (2011). Panels E and F show the impulse response to a discretionary untargeted
increase in transfers. The e⁄ect on output and employment is two to three times larger
than before.
6 Conclusion
Almost all of the research on the short-run positive impact of government expenditures has
focused on government purchases. Yet, both the past trends in public ￿nances across the
OECD, as well as the more recent responses to the great recession, have been dominated by
increases in social transfers. Perhaps these changes in transfers have no e⁄ects on employ-
ment and output, as is implicit in representative-agent models with Ricardian equivalence.
But just as likely, this is just a fertile area of research of new research for macroeconomics.
This paper tried to move forward by building a model where social transfers are ex-
23pansionary through the two leading mechanisms that are routinely used to explain the
expansionary impact of government consumption. The neoclassical channel emphasizes
the e⁄ect of lowering wealth of marginal workers, thus inducing them to increase labor sup-
ply. The Keynesian e⁄ect relies instead on transferring resources from households with a
low marginal propensity to consume to those with a high marginal propensity to consume,
thus boosting consumption, aggregate demand and output. The two ingredients that give
rise to these e⁄ects are incomplete insurance markets against income shocks, and nominal
rigidities in setting prices.
Fiscal policy of the United States in 2007-09 seemed to involve a large discretionary
increase in transfers. Using our model to assess the quantitative e⁄ect of this policy, we
found that it likely boosted output and employment, albeit by relatively modest amounts.
Our quantitative conclusions must still be taken as a ￿rst step. The jury is still out on
whether is possible to get quantitatively large transfer multipliers. It took almost thirty
years to go from the initial small purchases multipliers in Barro (1981) and Barro and King
(1984) to the large ones in Christiano et al. (2009). Perhaps the same will happen as
the study of the macroeconomic e⁄ects of government expenditures shifts towards social
transfers.
24Appendix
A.1. Proof of proposition 1
Index the continuum of agents by i. Then, the family of all households wishes to
maximize: Z 1 X
t=0
￿t [lncit ￿ ￿(1 ￿ hit)nit]di;
where each household receives the same weight since they were all ex ante identical at the
start of time. The family can choose any value for cit ￿ 0 and nit 2 f0;1g it wishes for each
agent at each period in time, since it can transfer resources across member freely through
the insurance payments. Integrating over all household￿ s budget constraints in equation
(3) gives the constraints of this maximization:
Ct + Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿ + rt)Kt + wtLt + dt ￿ Gt
Z
citdi = Ct and
Z
sitnitdi = Lt
for each period t.
Building the Lagrangian for this problem, with Lagrange multipliers ￿1t, ￿2t, ￿3t for the
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The variables with respect to which to maximize are: fCt;Lt;Kt+1;cit;nitg
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to individual and aggregate consumption are:
1
cit
= ￿2t and ￿1t = ￿2t
Multiplying both sides by cit, and integrating gives the solution for the multipliers: ￿1t =
￿2t = 1=Ct, as well as the sharing rule for individual consumption: cit = Ct. All consume
the same, since all were ex ante identical and they are all fully insured.
25The optimality condition with respect to capital is:
￿1t = ￿￿1t+1(1 ￿ ￿ + rt+1)
Replacing the Lagrange multiplier gives the Euler equation:
Ct+1
Ct
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + rt+1)
Finally, turn to the labor supply decision. It is clear from the structure of the problem
that if hit = 1, then nit = 1 as there is no utility loss and only a positive wage gain from
working. If hit < 1, it should also be clear that nit = 1 if and only if hit > h￿(sit), a
threshold that depends on the salary o⁄er of the agent. But then:
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(1 ￿ h￿)2dF(st) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2
￿
Using this result in the Lagrangian, the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to h￿ and Lt
are, respectively:
￿(1 ￿ h￿(sit)) = ￿3tsit and ￿1twt = ￿3t
Using the ￿rst-order condition for consumption to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers gives
the optimal labor supply de￿ning the h(:) function:








= ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
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sit (￿ ￿ h￿(sit))dF(s)










Collecting all the results, we are left with the Euler equation and the aggregate labor
supply equation. These are identical to the two optimality conditions from the representa-
tive consumer problem in proposition 1, proving the result.
A.2. Proof of proposition 2












De￿ning ￿ = 1 + ￿ gives immediately the result.
A.3. Proof of proposition 3
Combining propositions 1 and 2, all that remains is to check the market clearing con-
dition: Mt = dt ￿ Gt. But with ￿ exible prices dt = (￿ ￿ 1)wtLt. Using the de￿nition of
taxes in proposition 2, Mt = ￿wtLt ￿ Gt. Finally, to solve for employment:
Et =
Z
nitdi = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
(￿ ￿ h￿(sit))dF(s)











Combining with the expression for Lt in the proof of proposition 1 gives the expression for
Et.
A.4. Numerical solution of the full model
27We solve the household problem in the Bellman equations (1)-(5) numerically by value
function iteration. For the ￿rst few iterations, we discretize the state space, but once we
are close to the solution, we switch to interpolating the value function linearly, and using a
golden section search algorithm for the maximization. It is possible to reduce the dimension
of the state space from 3 to 2, by re-de￿ning variables, but after extensive experimentation
we found that surprisingly this did not materially speed up the calculations.
As for the production sector, the optimality conditions were described in section 3.2.
In the steady state, where all ￿rms are perfectly informed of the current state of a⁄airs that
has been lasting for an inde￿nitely long time, given values for X0 and r0, we can sequentially













L0 = X0 and d0 = (￿ ￿ 1)w0L0
Following a shock in period 1, only a fraction ￿t of the ￿rms know about it in period t.
Since prices are being set according to equations (10)-(11), the price index for intermediate
















where the second equality comes from equation (7).
In turn, letting XA
t be the output of attentive ￿rms, that have learned about the change,
and XI





t + (1 ￿ ￿t)X
I1=￿
t :
Of the following two expressions, the ￿rst comes from combining the production function
in equation (9), with the labor market clearing condition in equation (15), and the second
28from dividing the demand functions in (8):
Lt = ￿tXA
































As for dividends, note that:
dt = ￿tdA
t + (1 ￿ ￿t)dI
t
= ￿t(￿ ￿ 1)wtXA








where the second equality comes from equation (17). Again, we can replace for XA
t and XI
t
just as in the previous paragraph.
Combining all of the previous results then, given values for Xt and rt the variables in








































































29Combining all of the results gives the following algorithm, drawn from the original work
of Aiyagari (1994) to ￿nd the steady state:
1. Guess values for X and r.
2. Compute sequentially K, w, l, d using the steady-state optimality conditions for the
production sector.
3. Solve the decision problem of the household to obtain k0￿(k;s;h) and n￿(k;s;h).
4. Use this decision function and the exogenous transition function for s to build F(k;s;h).










and iterate until convergence.
For the transition dynamics to shocks, we follow the approach of Conesa and Krueger
(1999) starting from the programs of Heer and Maussner (2005). We adapt this previous
work to deal with transitory shocks (they had permanent shocks) as follows. First, we pick
a ￿nite T and assume that by that time the transitory shock to the exogenous variables has
disappeared and all of the endogenous variables have converged back to their steady state.
In the implementation, T = 120, and increasing it led to no noticeable di⁄erences in the
paths. Then, start by guessing the path: frt;XtgT
t=1. The optimality conditions in the
production sector in section 3.2 deliver the implied paths for fKt,wt,lt,dtgT
t=1. Knowing
that the value function at period T +1 is the one at the steady-state, applying steps 2-4 of
the algorithm for the steady state above gives the decision rules and value functions at date
T. Repeating this gives the decision rules at date T ￿ 1, and so on until date 1. Finally,
we use the decision rules to calculate fXt;rtgT
t=1 as in step 5 of the steady-state algorithm.
Iterating this procedure until convergence gives the transitional dynamics.
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United States  14.2%  75%  27%  25.4% 
        
Ireland  2.5%  232% ‐ 206%  37.9% 
Italy  1.0%  147%  32%  6.9% 
Luxembourg  4.3%  145% ‐ 60%  12.6% 
Portugal  7.4%  101%  4%  12.7% 
Japan  5.3%  86%  9% ‐ 9.3% 
Sweden  6.5%  69%  52%  19.9% 
Greece  17.2%  75%  22%  24.3% 
France  6.0%  74%  46%  9.5% 
Slovakia  20.7%  64%  34%  37.5% 
Netherlands  15.9%  63%  41%  23.8% 
Belgium  13.3%  60%  42%  15.4% 
Germany  9.2%  59%  44%  11.2% 
UK  17.3%  52%  47%  24.4% 
Spain  11.1%  47%  50%  17.1% 
Finland  11%  43%  56%  25.7% 
Poland  30.2%  40%  52%  21.9% 
Denmark  14.2%  36%  56%  19.8% 
Austria  5.4%  35%  65%  6.8% 
Czech Republic  10.3%  34%  62%  3.7% 
Canada  11.2%  31%  76%  4.2% 
Hungary ‐ 4.3%  78%  44% ‐ 9.9% 
Notes: The data are quarterly and from the integrated government accounts from NIPA, Eurostat and 




















Notes:  Annual  data  from  Tables  3.12  and  3.2  of  NIPA.  Purchases  plus  transfers  do  not  equal 
expenditures because interest payments are omitted. Total transfers do not equal capital plus social 
transfers in part because subsidies are omitted. 
  Table 3. Parameter values 
 
First group: standard steady‐state moments to match US post‐war averages 
 
Parameter  Value 
β  0.96 
α  0.36 
δ  0.09 
Moments targeted: interest rate 4%, capital share of income 36%, ratio of consumption of non‐durables 
and services to investment and consumption of durables 3. 
 
Second group: markups and shocks  from other studies 
Parameter  Value 
μ  1.25 
λ  0.50 
ρ  0.90 
σ  0.25 
π  0.51 
η  0.32 
Moments targeted: average markup in the U.S. economy 25%, fraction of population inattentive 12 
months after the shock 50%, serial correlation of income shocks 0.9, standard deviation of salary offers 
0.25, fraction of U.S. workforce that reports no disability affecting their work 0.51, Frisch elasticity of 
labor supply 0.7, ratio of employment to population 59%. 
 
Third group: parameters related to the size of government 
Parameter  Value 
χ  2.20 
τ  0 without steady‐state transfers 
0.11 with systematic transfers 
γs  0.12 
γh  0.17 
Moments targeted: government spending over GDP 0, transfers over GDP 12.6%, medical care transfers 
as a share of total transfers 0.45. 
 
   Figure 1. Impulse response to a transfer targeted to enhance the neoclassical channel 
 
Panel A. Optimal work threshold for the sick 
 
Panel B. Work response by quartiles 
 
 
Panel C. Response of aggregate employment 
 
 
Panel D. Response of aggregate output 
 
 
   Figure 2. Impulse response to a transfer targeted to enhance the Keynesian channel 
 
Panel A. Marginal propensity to consume if healthy
 
Panel B. Consumption response by quartiles 
 
 
Panel C. Response of aggregate employment 
 
 
Panel D. Response of aggregate output 
 Figure 3. The response of the model economy to the 2007‐09 fiscal expansion 
 
Panel A. Optimal work threshold for the sick 
 
Panel B. Marginal propensity to consume  
 
Panel C. Response of aggregate employment to 
increase in transfers, from top to bottom of 
distribution, or more generous systematic rule 
 
Panel D. Response of aggregate output to increase 
in transfers, from top to bottom of distribution, or 
more generous systematic rule 
 
Panel E. Response of aggregate  employment to 
government purchases and alternative calibration 
 
Panel F. Response of output to government 
purchases and alternative calibration 
 